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Abstract. This article develops a model of bank runs and crises and analyses
how the presence of a lender of last resort (LOLR) aﬀects the solvency of the banking
system. We obtain a one to one mapping from the depositors’ equilibrium strategy
to an optimal contract prevailing in the economy. The study ﬁnds that the diﬀerence
between a perfectly informed and an imperfectly informed LOLR can be crucial. Our
results indicate that a perfectly informed LOLR is a Pareto improvement. However,
if the supervisory process of the LOLR is subject to noise, then the gains from ex
post eﬃciency may be outweighed by ex ante ineﬃciency induced by moral hazard
which is conducive to lower lending rates in the economy.
1. Introduction
Banks are an integral part of the economy as they provide an important channel through
which funds are transferred from investors to the entrepreneurial sector. However, history
has shown that banks are subject to runs and panics. A bank run occurs when depositors
fearing that the bank will be unable to fulﬁll its obligations, attempt to withdraw their
funds immediately. If a bank run is severe enough, then even healthy banks can ultimately
become insolvent or even bankrupt. Such banking crises can seriously disrupt economic
activity.1 Because of the central position of ﬁnancial intermediaries in the economy, the
adverse impact of banking crises on economic activity cannot be overemphasised.
Since banks hold only a fraction of their deposits as reserves, they are vulnerable to
liquidity shocks which might hit the economy as such shocks might induce panic and may
aﬀect the behaviour of the depositors. The role of the central bank as a lender of last resort
was thus a natural response to the fractional reserve system. Some economists claim that
the LOLR is not necessary in a well developed ﬁnancial system as the interbank market
can provide liquidity to solvent banks facing liquidity problems.2 However, as argued
by Goodhart and Huang (2003), the interbank market cannot provide liquidity in two
instances. First, the interbank market might not suﬃce in case of a market failure, for
instance, when a large amount, which is too much for a single bank, is needed to bail out
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a solvent institution.3 Second, the market mechanism cannot provide insurance against
liquidity shocks which aﬀect the whole economy.
Since Diamond and Dybvig (1983) there has been a growing interest in models of
bank runs. However the problem with Diamond-Dybvig type models is that runs take
place because of self-fulﬁlling equilibria subsequent to liquidity shocks experienced by
depositors and hence are random events. The Diamond Dybvig model exhibits multiple
equilibria and the good or the bad equilibrium might prevail irrespective of the underlying
fundamentals. In practice, however, bank runs take place when the depositors doubt the
solvency of the bank given their beliefs regarding the underlying fundamentals. Thus
the bad equilibrium is more likely to prevail if fundamentals are weak and vice versa.
Evidence by Gorton (1988) supports this view. He ﬁnds that during the US National
Banking Era (1865-1914), panics were triggered when the leading indicator of recession
reached a threshold level. His results therefore reject the sunspot theories of panics.
Our approach is based on the ‘global games’ methodology ﬁrst introduced by Carlsson
and van Damme (1993) and later modiﬁed by Morris and Shin (1998). As discussed in
more detail later in this paper, it is not straightforward to apply this approach to banking
crises because it is based on the assumption that an agents incentive to take a particular
action increases as more and more agents take that action. In general, however, bank
run models do not satisfy this assumption of ‘full strategic complementarities’ because
if the bank is already bankrupt then an agents payoﬀ from withdrawing decreases when
more and more depositors run. Nevertheless, Dasgupta (2002) and Goldstein and Pauzner
(2002) get round this problem and show that a unique equilibrium can still be obtained
in bank run models. The advantage of using global games analysis is that it enables us
to link the probability of crises to the real economy.
Our paper also provides a methodological contribution to the global games literature.
We show that for any equilibrium strategy of depositors, there exists a corresponding
optimal lending rate in the economy. Thus by using global games we are not only able
to identify a unique equilibrium in the depositors’ strategy but are also able to pin down
and study the unique optimal contract.
As mentioned by Goodhart and Huang (2003), there have been few formal models
analysing the role of the LOLR. Goodhart and Huang study the trade oﬀ faced by the
LOLR between contagion and moral hazard eﬀects. They show that even in the presence
of moral hazard, providing LOLR facilities is justiﬁed given the cost of contagion. Freixas
(1999) considers the optimal bail out policy of the LOLR. However, Freixas restricts
attention to the bail out (or liquidation) of insolvent banks.4 He justiﬁes the ‘too big to
fail’ argument by assuming that the cost of bank liquidation increases with size and hence
concludes that it might be rational to bail out an insolvent bank. In contrast, we focus
on the bail out of solvent but illiquid banks, in the presence of both perfect and imperfect
information.
Perhaps the paper that comes closest to ours is the one by Rochet and Vives (2002).
Rochet and Vives analyse the role of the LOLR in the presence of coordination failure
among depositors. They study a LOLR whose objective is to bail out solvent banks
facing liquidity problems and they show that for an intermediate range of fundamentals,
3For example, on November 21st 1985, the Bank of New York required a bail-out because of a computer
bug in its T-Bills clearing system which denied any incoming payments. The Fed then had to provide
an emergency loan of $22.6 billion which was too much for a single bank and because of coordination
problems could not be provided by the market as a whole.
4Freixas assumes that solvent banks will be bailed out by the interbank market. However as discussed
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there may exist solvent but illiquid banks. These features of their model are similar to
ours. Rochet and Vives show that the LOLR is a Pareto improvement as it can avoid
the cost of ineﬃcient liquidation. They thus conclude that Bagehot was right after all
in claiming that there exists a role for the LOLR in lending to illiquid solvent ﬁnancial
institutions. However throughout their analysis they assume that the LOLR has perfect
information about the bank’s fundamentals. We show in our work that the results can
change dramatically if a small amount of noise is introduced in the supervisory process of
the LOLR. We show that if the LOLR only imperfectly observes the bank’s fundamentals
then the moral hazard problem sets in as the bank realises that it might be bailed out
even when it is insolvent. It is important to study the imperfect information scenario as
it is realistic given the diﬃculty often faced by policymakers in distinguishing between
solvency and liquidity problems.
There are three main objectives of our model. First, we intend to show clearly how
shocks are transmitted within sectors via the banking system. This can be done by endo-
genising the entrepreneurial sector in a bank runs model. Most of the existing literature
on banking crises takes the asset side of the bank activities as given and assumes that
the bank’s returns are determined by an exogenously given production function. How-
ever, a general equilibrium setting gives a clear picture of where the bank’s return comes
from and it is then possible to see clearly how a liquidity shock is transmitted from the
entrepreneurial sector to the depositors via the banking system, and conversely how the
depositors’ equilibrium behaviour aﬀects the behaviour of the entrepreneurs. More impor-
tantly, such a setting enables us to characterise the optimal contract between the banks
and the entrepreneurs, and thus the lending rate is determined endogenously in the model.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst one which analyses if and how the
presence of the LOLR has any aﬀect on the lending rate and hence on entrepreneurial
investment.
Second, an important objective of the model is to study how the presence of the
LOLR aﬀects the solvency of the banking system. Many economists have argued that
the presence of the LOLR is conducive to moral hazard.5 However, these arguments have
tended to be informal and have thus failed to show under what circumstances the presence
o ft h eL O L Rw i l lh a v ea na d v e r s ea ﬀect on the solvency of the banking system. Because
of this, precise policy recommendations have been diﬃcult to justify. We clearly show
when and how the presence of the LOLR will cause a moral hazard problem and how this
can be mitigated.
Lastly, but not least important, we analyse implications for the transparency of the
banking system. Since rational agents base their decisions on all available information,
it is crucial to study how more or less transparency of the banking system has an aﬀect
on the evolution of crises. We show that the diﬀerence between common knowledge and
almost common knowledge is non trivial. We thus carry out a comprehensive study of
how a banking crisis occurs in the presence of both perfect and imperfect information,
with and without the presence of the LOLR.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup
and the main players in the model. Section 3 incorporates a macroeconomic shock in
the basic setup. Section 4 considers the second best contract which will prevail in the
absence of any bank runs. Section 5 then introduces bank runs and derives solvency and
failure thresholds of banks. Section 6 studies the perfect information benchmark of the
model. Section 7 introduces asymmetric information between banks and the depositors
5See, for example, Calomiris (1998) and Krugman (1998).Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?4
and studies the equilibrium behaviour of the depositors in this imperfect information
setting. Section 8 analyses how the presence of an imperfectly informed LOLR aﬀects
the economy. Section 9 provides a discussion of the model and ﬁnally section 10 gives a
summary of the main results.
2. The Basic Setup and the Players
Consider an economy with three periods, t =0 ,1,2. There exists a single divisible con-
sumption good in each period. There are three types of agents in the economy: depositors,
ﬁnancial intermediaries or banks,a n dentrepreneurs. Later on we will introduce a fourth
agent, the central bank or the LOLR. The model can also be applied to an international
setting, where the depositors can be interpreted as international investors and the central
bank can be thought of as the international lender of last resort, like the IMF.
All lenders (depositors and banks) have access to a risk free storage technology such
that one unit of a good at t =0becomes (1 + r) units at t =2 .T h u s (1 + r) can be
thought of as the opportunity cost of funds between t =0and t =2 .F u r t h e r , c r e d i t
markets are competitive, i.e. there are more agents who wish to invest in the risky assets
than there are investment opportunities available. Thus the number of depositors or
investors are large relative to the available entrepreneurial projects. Finally, all agents
are risk neutral. We now give a brief description of the three agents in our economy.
2.1. Entrepreneurs. The economy is populated with a total of T entrepreneurs, each
of which has access to a perfectly divisible risky technology. The entrepreneurs have zero
wealth and therefore require funding for their projects. The risky technology converts 1
unit of the consumption good at t =0to X units at t =2with probability p and 0 with
probability 1−p.6 The entrepreneurs are heterogeneous and thus the probability of success
varies for each entrepreneur depending on his or her skills. The probability of success pj of
entrepreneur j can be thought of as a measure of the skill of entrepreneur j or alternatively
as a measure of the quality of the project which the entrepreneur has access to. The
probability of success p is a random variable which is independent across entrepreneurs.
Let f (p) be the density function of p on [0,1] and F (p) the corresponding cumulative
distribution. The entrepreneur’s skill, pj, is private information and is observed neither
by the intermediary nor the depositors. Further, p is realised at t =1and hence in the
interim period the entrepreneurs know whether their projects have succeeded or failed.
The reservation utility of the entrepreneurs is b units of the consumption good. b can
be interpreted as the wage income of the entrepreneurs if they decide not to take up the
risky projects. Hence b represents the value of the entrepreneurs’ outside option.
2.2. Depositors. There are D investors or depositors each endowed with 1 unit of
the consumption good for investment purposes. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) there
are two types of depositors: patient depositors and impatient depositors. The patient
agents prefer to consume at t =2 , while impatient agents can only consume at t =1 .
A proportion θ of the depositors are impatient while a proportion 1 − θ are patient. At
t =0 , the depositors do not know whether they are of the impatient or patient types.
This information is revealed to the depositors at t =1 . The depositors’ type is iid and is
their private information. Thus a patient depositor can claim to be of the impatient type
at t =1 .
6In section 3 we will introduce an exogenous shock which will adversely aﬀect the success probability
of projects.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?5
2.3. Banks. The banks just act as intermediaries between the depositors and the
entrepreneurs and they channel funds from the investors to the entrepreneurial sector.
The banks exist in this model primarily because of two reasons. First, the banks can
perfectly and costlessly observe whether the entrepreneurs’ projects succeeded or not.
There is therefore no moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and the banks.
Second, as in Diamond (1984), banks can rely on the strong law of large numbers (SLLN)
and hence they can diversify out any idiosyncratic risk. This allows us to focus on systemic
risk.7
The banking sector is perfectly competitive. Since banks make zero proﬁts, they oﬀer
the same contract to entrepreneurs as the one that would be oﬀered by a single bank
maximising the welfare of the agents in the economy. It would thus be simple to think of
the homogenous group of banks as one single bank.
The bank oﬀers deposit contracts the structure of which is as follows: for every unit
of endowment deposited at t =0 , the face value of the deposit at t =2is (1 + h) > 1.
Given risk neutrality the face value of the deposit at t =2is determined in a manner such
that depositors on average get the opportunity cost of funds (1 + r). Thus a bank failure
occurs whenever the return of the bank is less than the opportunity cost of funds. Further
the depositor can demand early withdrawal at t =1 , in which case the bank promises to
pay (1 + r) units, which is the reservation utility of the depositors.8
The bank can allocate its endowments to three possible alternatives. It can invest
its endowments in the risky projects of the entrepreneurs; it can invest the funds in
the riskless storage technology; and ﬁnally it can retain a fraction of its endowments as
reserves to meet the demand of the impatient investors. ‘Reserves’ can be interpreted as
a short term storage technology such that one unit retained as reserves at t =0gives one
unit at t =1 . Thus, reserves have a zero net rate of return. Henceforth, the short term
storage technology will be referred to as reserves and the long term storage technology
will just be referred to as the storage technology.
Given competitive credit markets, we assume that the bank always has enough funds
to ﬁnance all of the entrepreneurs willing to initiate their risky projects. Clearly, holding
reserves is costly, and the bank would like to hold as low a level of reserves as possible.
This is because, the bank faces a positive opportunity cost to holding reserves as any
c o n s u m p t i o ng o o dn o tr e t a i n e da sr e s e r v e sc a nb es t o r e di nt h er i s kf r e es t o r a g et e c h -
nology. Thus the opportunity cost of retaining one unit of the endowment in reserves
is (1 + r), which is the return from the riskless storage technology. Later on, we will
see that ultimately this opportunity cost will be borne by the entrepreneurs, and thus in
competitive credit markets, it will not be in the interest of any bank to hold more reserves
than is necessary. The reason why banks hold any reserves at all is that liquidating the
entrepreneurial projects/storage technology in the interim period is more costly relative
to holding reserves. This will be discussed in more detail in section 5.
Let I represent the bank’s investment portfolio comprising of investment in the risky
projects and the risk free storage technology. Then
I = Ip + Is (1)
where Ip and Is denote the total investments in the entrepreneurial projects and storage
technology respectively. Let ωp =
Ip
I denote the fraction of investment funds invested in
7Note that in the absence of any systemic risk there will be no uncertaintly in the model as long as
the SLLN holds. Uncertainty will be introduced in section 3 of the paper.
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the entrepreneurial projects.
3. Macroeconomic Shock
We now introduce uncertainty in the basic setup of our model. In the interim period,
t =1 , a macroeconomic shock,
∼
φ, hits the entrepreneurial sector and subsequently the
return of the bank.
We model the macroeconomic shock as a multiplicative shock that aﬀects the pro-
portion of projects that succeed. In the absence of any systemic risk the proportion of
successful projects will be
−
p if the SLLN holds, where
−
p is the average skill level of the
active entrepreneurs.9. However when the macroeconomic shock hits the economy, the
proportion of successful projects are scaled by
∼








.T h u si nt h ep r e s -




φ. This will subsequently
aﬀect the bank’s return since the return of the bank is a function of the proportion of
successful projects.10 Note that since the shock is systemic in nature, it cannot be insured
by the interbank market.
Further, this will also aﬀect the ex ante success probability of entrepreneurs. This is
because the macroeconomic shock hits all the projects that have not yet failed at t =1 .
Assuming that the shock can randomly hit any entrepreneur whose project has not yet
failed at t =1 , the ex ante success probability of a project is given by πj = pj ·
∧
φ,w h e r e
∧
φ ≡ E (φ)=
1+φ
−
2 . Thus in order for a project to succeed, the project must be ‘good’
and it must survive the random shock
∼
φ, the expected value of which is given by
∧
φ.T h i s
formulation implies that the success probability depends not only on entrepreneurial skill
but also on a common risk factor.11 Thus in the presence of an exogenous shock the
probability of success across projects is no longer iid but is aﬀected by a common factor
φ.
The information structure of the model is such that the banks perfectly observe the
realisation of the shock. The investors, however, may perfectly or imperfectly observe the
realisation of
∼
φ. (We analyse these two cases in later sections.) The ex ante distribution
of the shock is public information and is thus known by all the agents. The shock, φ ,c a n
also be interpreted as a measure of the fundamentals of the banks. Thus, banks are aware
of their fundamentals but the investors or the regulator may or may not have perfect
information regarding the bank fundamentals. As we will see this will have interesting
implications for the behaviour of the depositors and the entrepreneurs in the economy.
4. The Optimal Contract with no Bank Runs
We now derive the optimal contract in the presence of uncertainty with no bank runs
taking the interim deposit contract as given. The ‘no runs’ optimal contract will provide
a benchmark against which we can later measure the welfare eﬀects of introducing a LOLR
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fb a n kr u n s .
To specify the optimal contract between the entrepreneurs and a competitive interme-
diary we ﬁrst examine the entrepreneurs’ decisions more closely. As a ﬁrst step note that
9S e ef o o t n o t e1 2 .
10We will derive an explicit expression of the bank’s return in the following section.
11To avoid confusion we will henceforth refer to pj as the skill level of entrepreneur j as distinct from
πj which is the actual success probability.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?7
not all entrepreneurs will be willing to undertake their projects. We know that in the
presence of systemic risk, entrepreneur j’s project will succeed with probability πj and
fail with probability 1−πj,w h e r eπj = pj ·
∧
φ. Thus, entrepreneur j will invest if and only
if the expected beneﬁt of doing so is greater than the opportunity cost as measured by
the value of the outside option, b. Therefore only the entrepreneurs who are good enough
in terms of having a high likelihood of succeeding will undertake their risky projects. The
measure of entrepreneurial skill is pj and thus if pj is high enough, entrepreneur j will
take up his project. Let p∗ be the reservation skill level, i.e. entrepreneurs with pj ≥ p∗
will undertake their projects whilst the others will consume their outside option. Then
F (p∗) is the fraction of projects that are rejected and 1 − F (p∗) is the fraction that are
accepted. Then,
−
p = E (p|p ≥ p∗)=
R 1
p∗ pdF (p)
1 − F (p∗)
.
To give more structure to the problem, suppose that p is uniformly distributed on
[0,1]. Assuming that entrepreneurs are evenly spaced on [0,1], the total number of
active entrepreneurs who accept their projects is N = T (1 − p∗), while the rest of the
entrepreneurs, T − N, consume their outside option. Then given that p ∼ U [0,1] the




2 . Assuming for now that there
are no exogenous shocks on the economy, then the actual proportion of the projects which
succeed is
−
p, given the strong law of large numbers.12
We can now deduce the bank’s rate of return at t =2 .L e t R denote the bank’s
rate of return. Suppose that (1 + ρ) is the lending rate charged by the banks to the
entrepreneurs. Then the bank’s rate of return from its investment portfolio is a weighted
average of the return from the entrepreneurial projects and the return from the storage
technology. Note that the rate of return from the entrepreneurial projects is (1 + ρ) ×
(proportion of projects succeeded). Hence, in the absence of an exogenous shock, the








If at t =1 , a macroeconomic shock,
∼
φ, hits the returns of the banks, then the bank’s rate










+( 1− ωp)(1+r).( 2 )
Having derived an expression for the bank’s rate of return we can now characterise
the optimal contract. Suppose only the truly impatient depositors withdraw their funds
12More formally, if there are no exogenous shocks on the economy, then the actual successes or failures
of the projects are independent and identically distributed so that they form a sequence of Bernoulli trials
with success parameter
−
p. Then the number of successful projects, ´ s, will have a binomial distribution
with mean N
−




















. The distribution of the
proportion of successful projects follows from this and hence if λ is the proportion of projects which







.T h e nn o t et h a ta sN →∞ , λ →
−
p. Therefore, in the limit if the
SLLN holds, then the actual proportion of projects that succeed will be exactly
−
p, abstracting from any
exogenous shocks on the economy.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?8
in the interim period so that there are no bank runs in the economy. Let re denote the







φ be the average success probability. Then the optimal contract










θ(1 + r)+( 1− θ)E∼
R [1 + h] ≥ 1+r (4)
re ≥ θD(1 + r) (5)
I
½




φ +( 1− ωp)(1+r)
¾
≥ (1 − θ)DE∼
R [1 + h] (6)
I + re ≡ D (7)
p∗ =a r gm a x( 1− F(p∗))[π(X − (1 + ρ))] + F(p∗)b.( 8 )
Expression (3) is the entrepreneurs’ expected utility which is a weighted average of
the expected net proﬁt from a typical project and the value of the outside option. Since
credit markets are competitive, the optimal contract maximises the expected utility of
the entrepreneurs subject to constraints (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8).
Constraint (4) is the investor rationality constraint of the depositors. At time t =0 ,
the depositors do not know whether they are patient or impatient, and thus they will
invest if and only if their expected ex ante return is at least equal to the opportunity cost
of their funds. Since the depositors get (1 + r) if they turn out to be impatient, thus the
constraint can also be rewritten as
E∼
R [1 + h] ≥ 1+r.( 9 )
Thus the investor rationality constraint requires that the face value of the deposit con-
straint at t =2be such that the depositors on average at least receive the opportunity
cost of their endowments.
Constraint (5) is the reserve constraint of the bank, which is the requirement that the
level of the bank’s reserves be at least suﬃcient to satisfy the impatient depositors who
withdraw their funds in the interim period t =1 . Constraint (6) is the requirement that
the total expected return of the bank on its investment portfolio, I, be at least equal to
the total reservation utility of the patient depositors. It can be thus be thought of as the
bank’s investor rationality constraint.
Constraint (7) is actually a balance sheet identity which states that the total assets
of the bank be equal to its total liabilities. Thus the investment in the risky portfolio,
I, plus the reserves, re, cannot exceed the total amount of deposits in the bank. Hence
constraint (7) can be thought of as the budget constraint of the bank.
13The optimal contract here bears some resemblance to the optimal ﬁnancial contract studied by
Bernanke and Gertler (1990) when borrower type is unobservable. However, Bernanke and Gertler con-
sider a two period model and hence they do not model reserves.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?9
Finally constraint (8) is the incentive compatibility condition of the entrepreneurs
which states that the reservation skill level, p∗, chosen by the entrepreneur is such that it
maximises his expected utility subject to the terms of the ﬁnancial contract. Taking the







[X − (1 + ρ)] = b. (10)
According to equation (10), p∗ is the threshold skill level such that entrepreneurs are
just indiﬀerent between proceeding with their risky project and consuming their outside
option. Hence entrepreneurs with a skill level pj ≥ p∗ p r o c e e dw i t ht h e i rr i s k yp r o j e c t s
as the expected return net of the payment to the intermediary exceeds their opportunity
cost.
We assume that X − (1 + ρ) − b>0 so that the projects are feasible in the sense
that if the project is successful than the return exceeds the interest payment to the bank
and the reservation utility of the entrepreneurs. This also ensures that the second order
condition X>(1 + ρ) is satisﬁed.
Thus, the optimal contract maximises the expected proﬁts of the entrepreneurs subject
to the investor rationality constraint of the depositors, the investor rationality constraint
of the bank, the reserve constraint, the budget constraint of the bank and the incentive
compatibility condition of the entrepreneurs.14






















re = θD(1 + r) (13)




φ[X − (1 + ρ)]
. (15)
Proof. Since X>(1 + ρ)+b,w eh a v eap r o b l e mw i t hﬁve constraints (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8) and a concave objective function (3). To solve the problem we should ﬁrst establish
that all the constraints must bind. Note ﬁrst that the objective is monotonically decreasing
14Krasa and Villamil (1992) also consider competitive credit markets and the optimal contract in their
setup maximises the entrepreneurs’ proﬁts subject to investor rationality constraints. However, they do
not model the entrepreneurs and hence they do not have an incentive compatibility condition. Further,
they have a two period model. However in a three period model, we also need a reserve constraint as
investors can withdraw in the interim period. This reserve constraint is crucial and we will see later, how
the possibility of bank runs aﬀects the reserve constraint and hence the optimal contract.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?10
in (1 + ρ). Thus constraint (6) must be binding; otherwise given a competitive banking
sector, a bank could lower the lending rate and attract all the entrepreneurs. Thus in
a competitive market, constraint (6) will be binding and will actually be the zero proﬁt
condition of the bank. Since constraint (6) is binding, this implies that constraint (4)
which is equivalent to (9) must also be binding. Thus we can rewrite constraint (6) as
the following zero proﬁt condition
I
½




φ +( 1− ωp)(1+r)
¾
=( 1− θ)D(1 + r). (16)
Next note that the zero proﬁt condition implies that the lending rate (1 + ρ) is decreasing
monotonically in I. Given the budget constraint (7), (1 + ρ) is therefore monotonically
increasing in re. Hence, constraint (5) must also bind. Having established that all the
constraints must be binding, we have four linear equations (4), (5), (6), (7) in four un-
knowns 1+h, re, 1+ρ, I. Solving these gives us the solution in (11), (12), (13), and (14).
As for p∗, we have already shown that constraint (8) is equivalent to equation (10). This
gives us the threshold p∗ in (15).
The interpretation of the optimal contract is simple. The level of reserves held by
the bank will be as low as possible since reserves have a positive opportunity cost. Thus,
reserves will be just suﬃcient to payoﬀ the impatient depositors in the interim period. The
total demand of the impatient depositors in the interim period is θD(1 + r) and hence
this will be the level of the bank’s reserves. The rest of the bank’s resources (D−re) will
then be devoted to investment purposes.
Next note, that for every depositor who withdraws in the interim period, the bank has
to hold (1 + r) units as reserves instead of one unit, given that the reserves have a zero
net rate of return. This extra cost of r units per depositor who withdraws in the interim
period, ultimately has to be recovered from the entrepreneurial projects. The total cost
is θDr units since the total number of impatient depositors is θD. This cost will be
recovered from the entrepreneurial sector and will be divided over the total number of
active entrepreneurs, N. This explains why the lending rate charged by the bank to each
entrepreneur, as given in equation (11), is equal to the risk free rate scaled by average
project risk and then adjusted to retrieve the extra cost incurred by the bank to service
withdrawals in the interim period. This lending rate ensures that all the investors on
average receive their reservation utility.
The face value of the deposit contract, 1+h, is simply equal to the risk free rate scaled
b yt h ea v e r a g er i s ki nt h ee c o n o m y .
Finally, the threshold skill level, p∗,a se x p e c t e di si n c r e a s i n gi nt h ev a l u eo ft h e
outside option but decreasing in the expected return from the project. The threshold p∗
determines the amount of investment in the entrepreneurial projects since Ip = T (1 − p∗).
Naturally, the higher the skill threshold, thel o w e rw o u l db et h ei n v e s t m e n tl e v e la n dv i c e
versa. Also observe that the reserve level has an aﬀect on p∗ through the lending rate. An
increase in the level of reserves, increases p∗ and thus reduces the amount of investment
in the economy.
The optimal contract just derived is the second best contract since entrepreneurial
type is unobvservable. The intermediary therefore faces a problem of adverse selection
whereby it cannot distinguish the diﬀerent probabilities of success. Thus we have a pooling
equilibrium where the intermediary oﬀers the same contract to all the entrepreneurs. In
a world, with observable types, however, the ﬁrst best contract will prevail, and in such
a world, the intermediary would oﬀer diﬀerent contracts to each entrepreneur. Thus,Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?11
in the ﬁrst best world, we would have a separating equilibrium and the bank would
charge each entrepreneur an interest rate commensurate with his probability of success.
As suggested by Bernanke and Gertler (1990), when an intermediary faces a problem of
adverse selection, there is naturally a cross subsidisation from the good types to the bad
types. This cross subsidisation also exists in our setup since the lending rate set by the
bank is based on average project risk and thus below average entrepreneurs gain at the
expense of above average entrepreneurs.
5. Bank Runs
We now introduce bank runs in our model, so that patient depositors may also withdraw
their deposits in the interim period. Let n be the actual proportion of depositors who
withdraw their money in the intermediate period, t =1 . W em a yn o wh a v eas i t u a t i o n
where the bank’s reserves are insuﬃcient to meet the demands of the depositors. If in the
intermediate period the bank is unable to meet the demands of its depositors then the
bank will have to ineﬃciently liquidate some of its investments. The bank will cover the
shortfall between the demands of the investors and the reserves by ineﬃciently liquidating
af r a c t i o nξ of its investment portfolio I.
It would be simple to think of the bank’s investment portfolio as a mutual fund (com-
prising of both investment in the risky project and investment in the riskless asset). Thus,
when the bank’s reserves are insuﬃcient, the bank sells a portion of its fund in the market.
For the sake of tractability and simplicity we therefore do not either assume that the bank
liquidates its risky investments ﬁrst or its riskless investments. The bank just liquidates
a certain proportion of its mutual fund to meet the demands of its depositors. This is
without loss of generality and simpliﬁes our exposition.
Let Rl denote the rate of return per unit of liquidation of the bank’s portfolio. The
bank does not obtain the full value of the assets from the sale and the diﬀerence between
the actual portfolio value and the liquidation value can be interpreted as the cost of
premature liquidation.15 We impose the following restrictions on Rl:
0 <R l < 1.
Rl > 0 since the average value of the bank’s portfolio is greater than zero. Thus the sale
of a fraction of the bank’s portfolio should fetch a positive value. However Rl < 1 as
otherwise it would never be in the interest of any bank to hold positive reserves. The
restriction is only sensible and implies that liquidation is costly enough to induce banks
to hold some reserves. Hence premature liquidation is costly and ineﬃcient.
5.1. The optimal contract with bank runs. I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fb a n kr u n s ,t h e
optimal contract derived in section (4) will no longer hold as the reserve constraint (5)
15One explanation of why premature liquidation is costly is that the secondary market is charecterised
by a problem of adverse selection as in Flannery (1996) and Rochet and Vives (2002). The investments
of the bank consist of a continuum of assets and agents in the secondary market are inﬁnitesimal and
cannot observe the type of asset being sold to them. Each agent fears that he might end up with the
worst quality of asset and hence because of the problem of adverse selection, the bank’s assets are sold
at a discount to the their face value.
Note that if the depositors had invested their endowments in the riskless storage technology instead
of the bank, then all impatient depositors would have liquidated their investments at the face value of
1+r. Thus the problem of asymmetric information does not arise when the impatient investor in isolation
liquidates the storage technology as he holds only one type of asset. This also justiﬁes why the bank’s
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will be invalid if the patient depositors can also withdraw their funds in the interim period.
To solve for the optimal contract with bank runs, we will ﬁrst specify a generic reserve
level. We will then solve for the optimal contract implied by the generic reserve level.
Later on, we will specify what the optimal reserve level will be in the presence of bank
runs.
Suppose that the optimal reserve level of a bank is given by
re =
∧
nD(1 + r) (17)
where
∧
n ≥ θ, is the bank’s ex ante estimate of the proportion of depositors who will come
to the bank at t =1 . Given this generic reserve level, it is then straightforward to show

























Denote the second best contract speciﬁed in section (4) by the subscript SB. Then
observe that 1+ρ ≥ (1 + ρ)SB and I ≥ ISB. Thus in the presence of bank runs, the
size of the bank’s investment portfolio is smaller but more importantly, the lending rate
is higher. Thus fewer entrepreneurs, relative to the second best, will now participate and
thus there will be underinvestment in the economy.
Note that the optimal contract is completely deﬁned by
∧
n and that every level of
∧
n
corresponds to a diﬀerent optimal contract. We can restate this in the following remark.
Remark 1. There exists a one to one mapping from the depositors’ equilibrium strategy
to the optimal contract oﬀered by the banks to the entrepreneurs.
What remains therefore is the speciﬁcation of
∧
n. We leave this to later when we have
characterised the depositors’ equilibrium strategy.
5.2. Solvency and failure thresholds of banks. Having introduced bank runs,
we can now determine the solvency and failure thresholds of banks. To do so, however,
we need to adopt a deﬁnition of bank failure. We deﬁne bank failure as follows: A bank
failure occurs when the bank is unable to pay the opportunity cost of funds to the investors.
Hence a bank will fail when its depositors do not receive their reservation utility. Note
t h a ta c c o r d i n gt ot h i sd e ﬁnition a bank will not be classiﬁed as a failure if it covers the
opportunity cost of funds but is unable to pay the face value of deposits, 1+h,a tt =2 .
Since depositors are risk neutral, they will be satisﬁed as long as they receive at least their
reservation utility. This is why ex ante 1+h is chosen such that depositors on average
receive 1+r. Thus a bank will not fail as long as it pays at least 1+r to its depositors.17
16The proof is exactly on the same lines as that to Proposition 1.
17H o w e v e r ,i ft h eb a n kw e r er e q u i r e dt op a yo na v e r a g em o r et h a n1+r to its depositors for diﬀerent
reasons as risk aversion, bank credibility, etc., then ex ante the lending rate would be such that on
average the bank did pay this higher amount to the depositors. However, we keep our setup as simple as
possible and the depositors in the model will be satisifed as long as ex ante they receieve on average the
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We assume that there exists a φU < 1 such that if φ ∈ [φU,1], then the bank never
fails. We refer to the range [φU,1] as the upper dominance region. In other words, we are
assuming that if the bank fundamentals are high enough, such that systemic risk is very
limited, then the bank never fails. Dasgupta (2002) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2002)
also make a similar assumption. They assume that if the fundamentals driving the bank’s
return are very strong, then the bank does not fail. Nevertheless this assumption is more
plausible in our general equilibrium setting. This is because we have shown in section 3
that what we refer to as ‘bank fundamentals’ is essentially a measure of systemic risk. In
the absence of any systemic risk (φ =1 ), the banks never fail. Thus if systemic risk is very
limited (such that φ is arbitrarily close to 1) then the banking system will not collapse.18
Hence, it is only plausible to assume that there exists an upper dominance region, such
that if
∼
φ lies in that range then the banks will not fail.
We now consider three diﬀerent cases that banks may encounter. This will enable us
to specify the solvency, failure and bankruptcy thresholds of banks. Let re2 denote the
level of reserves, if any, the bank has at t =2 .
Case 1. If n = θ, so that only impatient depositors withdraw at t =1 , then no liquidation
will occur at t =1 , and the bank will fail at t =2if and only if
∼






D(1 + r). Substituting the values of re2,
∼
R and I the above condi-





φ. Thus the bank will be insolvent if it fails even if only the impatient
depositors withdraw in the interim period. The insolvency point is therefore φL and







dominance region, since the bank always fails in this region irrespective of the proportion
of depositors who run.
Case 2. If n>
∧
n then the bank will need to liquidates o m eo fi t si n v e s t m e n t s . T h e






D(1 + r).I n e ﬃcient liquidation would
fetch the bank Rl (ξI). The maximum amount that the bank can receive from liquidation
is RlI. Hence if re < nD(1 + r) ≤ re+RlI than there will be partial liquidation at t =1 .
Failure will now occur at t =2if and only if
∼








RlI . Substituting the values of
∼
R and I the above condition implies
that the bank will fail at t =2if and only if
∼
φ<φ f













(1−ξ)[θDr+N] . The failure threshold of the bank will now
increase relative to case 1 (i.e. φf >φ L) as a larger proportion of the depositors now
withdraw in the interim period and because premature liquidation is costly (Rl < 1).
Case 3. Finally if nD(1 + r) >r e+ RlI, then the bank will be closed down in the
intermediate period t =1 . Thus the bank will be bankrupt and closed down at t =1
whenever n>n B,w h e r e
nB =
∧
n(1 + r)(1− Rl)+Rl
1+r
. (20)
To summarise the discussion so far, the bank always fails if φ<φ L; the bank never fails
if φ ≥ φU; and in the range φ ∈ [φL,φ U), failure depends on the proportion of depositors
who withdraw their funds in the intermediate period t =1 . Thus if fundamentals are in
the range φ ∈ [φL,φ U), then we might have solvent but illiquid banks.
5.3. Investor payoﬀs. We next turn to the determination of the investor payoﬀs.
Assume that the bank’s returns are equally divided among investors. Then the payoﬀst o
the depositors are summarised in the following matrix.












Note that if the bank fails, then we will have one of two scenarios. Either the bank will
fail in the ﬁnal period t =2 , or it will go bankrupt and will be closed in the interim period
t =1 . Thus if depositors run and the bank fails then they will get 1+r if the bank is not
bankrupt. But if the bank is bankrupt then the proceeds from bankruptcy will be equally
divided among the investors. If the bank is bankrupt, and the depositors wait till t =2 ,
then they will get zero since all the bank’s investment will be liquidated in the interim
period (ξ =1 ).
It is clear from (21) that the depositors are better oﬀ by running if the bank fails and
by waiting if the bank does not fail.
6. Perfect information benchmark
Having completed the construction of the basic model in the presence of bank runs we now
turn to characterising the depositors’ equilibrium strategy. In this section we will assume
that depositors have perfect information regarding the fundamentals of the bank, i.e. the
depositors can perfectly observe the realised value of
∼
φ at t =1 . Thus the realisation of
∼
φ
is common knowledge. In the next section we will relax this assumption and consider the
more realistic case where depositors only imperfectly observe the realisation of
∼
φ.T h e
perfect information case will serve as a useful benchmark before we introduce imperfect
information.
It is clear from (21) that if the realised value of
∼
φ was common knowledge at t =1 ,
then all investors will run if φ<φ L as in this region the bank always fails. Conversely, if
φ ≥ φU, then the dominant strategy of the patient investors will be not to run irrespective
of the decision of the other depositors. However in the intermediate region φL <φ≤ φU,
there exist a multiplicity of equilibria a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and the payoﬀ to
each investor will now depend on the proportion of patient depositors who withdraw. IfBanking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?15
a patient depositor expects all other patient depositors not to withdraw then he will also
not withdraw his funds and hence an equilibrium will exist where all patient depositors do
not withdraw. On the other hand, if a patient depositor expects all the other depositors
to run, then an equilibrium will exist where everyone runs.
The Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium is for all (patient) investors to refrain from withdraw-
ing as long as the bank is solvent. Thus as long as φ>φ L, the (patient) depositors should
not run. However, because of coordination failure the dispersed depositors might not be
able to achieve the Pareto eﬃcient outcome.
6.1. Problems with the perfect information benchmark. There are essentially
three problems with the perfect information benchmark. Firstly, it is more realistic to
assume a small amount of noise in the signals of the dispersed depositors. Secondly, we
showed that in the region φ ∈ [φL,φ U) there exist multiple equilibria. In this region there
are two equilibria in pure strategies, where either everyone runs or none of the patient
depositors run, and one equilibrium in mixed strategy. Hence we have three possible
equilibria. The problem with having such multiple equilibria is that there will not exist
a unique optimal reserve level (since there will exist three possible values for
∧
n). Ex
ante the bank will anticipate three possible equilibria each associated with a diﬀerent
optimal reserve level. Hence we will be unable to identify a unique optimal contract if
we assume common knowledge on the part of the investors.19 The third problem is just
an implication of the second one. If we assume that all agents have perfect information,
then policy analysis becomes very diﬃcult because of the presence of multiple equilibria.
A policymaker will be unable to attach probabilities to the diﬀerent outcomes, which is
precisely the reason why it becomes impossible to identify a unique optimal contract.
6.2. LOLR and perfect information. We have seen that in the region φ ∈ [φL,φ U)
the Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium might not be attained because of coordination problems
and the economy might end up with the bad equilibrium where everyone runs even though
the banks are solvent. Thus, there exists a potential role for the lender of last resort.
Suppose there exists a LOLR, that announces that as long as the bank is solvent (i.e. as
long as φ ≥ φL), it will bail out the bank if anyone runs. We assume that the LOLR has
access to funds from international markets at the safe world rate of interest.2021 We also
assume for now that like the depositors, the LOLR is also perfectly informed about the
bank fundamentals and thus the bank is perfectly transparent.
If the LOLR is prepared to bail out all solvent institutions then we will no longer
have ineﬃcient liquidation as the LOLR will simply pay oﬀ any depositor who runs when
19We will show later how with imperfect information we can get rid of this problem using global games
methodology.
20We assume for simplicity that at t =1 , the LOLR can borrow from the international markets at a zero
rate of interest. Thus if the LOLR lends 1 unit of the consumption good to the bank in the interim period
then it will just be paid back 1 unit in the ﬁnal period, as long as the bank does not fail. Alternatively,
we could have assumed that the opportunity cost of funds between t =0and t =1is (1 + r0,1) and
that between t =1and t =2is (1 + r1,2) such that 1+r =( 1+r0,1)(1+r1,2). I ns u c hac a s e ,t h e
LOLR would have to be paid (1 + r1,2) for every unit lent in the interim period. However for reasons of
simplicity we work with the former assumption.
21This is especially true for an institution like the IMF which has access to funds at a positive but
relatively low rate of interest. Banks may not have access to international markets especially in times
of crises (unless a big lender is willing to bail them out as as such a bail out sends a positive signal as
regards to the solvency of the banks). Even if banks do have access to international markets in times of
crises, they are likely to face a high rate of interest and thus it makes sense for the LOLR rather than the
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the bank is solvent. Thus if information is perfectly transparent and if the LOLR’s
announcement is credible, then the dominant strategy of the patient depositors is not to
run as long as the bank is solvent. This is because in the presence of a perfectly informed
credible LOLR, the investors’ payoﬀs are independent of the proportion of agents who
run, as any ineﬃcient liquidation is avoided. We will thus no longer have a situation
where the bank is solvent but illiquid.
However, even in the absence of credibility, a situation where banks are solvent but
illiquid can be avoided as long as the LOLR is perfectly informed. In the absence of
credibility, ‘waiting’ will no longer be a dominant strategy when the banks are solvent,
as the depositors will not be certain if all solvent institutions will be bailed out.22 Hence
we might have panic based runs in the absence of LOLR credibility. Nevertheless as long
as the LOLR has perfect information regarding the liquidity shock the cost of premature
liquidation will be avoided. This is because the LOLR will simply bail out all solvent
institutions. We can thus conclude that in a perfectly transparent economy, the presence
o faL O L Rw i l lb eaP a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n t .
Furthermore, we will now also be able to identify a unique optimal reserve level. Since
premature liquidation will not take place as long as the bank is solvent, therefore, the
reserve level will be just suﬃcient to accommodate the impatient depositors. Thus the
reserve level will be re = θD which is the same as the no-runs reserve level. Hence the
second best optimal contract characterised in Proposition 1 will now prevail.
7. Imperfect information
We now extend our model to incorporate asymmetric information between the depositors
and the banks. Suppose that depositors do not perfectly observe the liquidity shock but
get precise albeit imperfect information regarding the fundamentals of the bank. In the
interim period investor i receives the realisation of the private signal
si = φ +  i (22)
where the noise term  i is independent across depositors and is uniformly distributed
over the interval [− , ]. Since the noise term is iid, thus the signals conditional on the
fundamentals are also independently and uniformly distributed across the depositors.
Rational agents will use their noisy signals primarily in two ways. First, after ob-
serving the signals, the depositors will update their beliefs of the shock φ and thus each
investor will update the prior distribution of φ with the posterior distribution. Second,
the signals will allow the agents to infer the beliefs of the other agents. Thus in this
environment, given the private signal, a depositor will form beliefs not only about the
underlying fundamentals but also about the beliefs of other players and other players’
beliefs about other player’ beliefs and so on. This is because the investors will realise that
their payoﬀs do not only depend on the economic fundamentals but also on the proportion
of people who run.
Agents will now condition their actions on their private signals and will run if the
expected conditional payoﬀ from running exceeds the expected conditional payoﬀ from
waiting and vice versa. As discussed by Morris and Shin (2000), the equilibrium strategy
of an investor will be such that it maximises his expected utility conditional on his private
22An example where such credibility is absent would be when it is not common knowledge that the
LOLR has perfect information regarding the bank’s fundamentals. We examine the case of an imperfectly
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information and the strategies followed by the other agents. We thus need to solve for
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the imperfect information game.
It is useful to rewrite the payoﬀ matrix in (21) as follows:







where nB is the bankruptcy threshold deﬁned in (20). It should be noted that we need
to solve for the equilibrium of a global game, where a global game was ﬁrst deﬁned by
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) as a game of incomplete information where the actual
payoﬀ structure is determined by a random draw from a given distribution and where
each player receives a noisy signal of the realisation. Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
and Morris and Shin (1998) showed that if a binary action global game satisﬁed full
strategic complementarities, i.e. an agent’s incentive to take a particular action increases
when more and more agents take that action, then there would exist a unique equilibrium
such that all agents will take a particular action if their signal is below a threshold signal
and vice versa.23
However, a general feature of bank run models is that they do no satisfy the property
of full strategic complementarities. As is clear from the payoﬀ matrix in (23), once the
bank is already bankrupt, the payoﬀ from running decreases as the number of agents
who are running increases.24 It is therefore not straightforward to show that a unique
equilibrium exists in models of banking crises. Rochet and Vives (2002) get round this
problem by assuming that the decision to withdraw in the interim period is delegated
to fund managers who face reputation costs. The fund managers prefer not to withdraw
early but their reputation suﬀers if they do not withdraw when the bank fails. With this
assumption the payoﬀs to the fund managers satisfy full strategic complementarities and
therefore the standard argument to show the uniqueness result can be used. Nevertheless
we follow the technical approach adopted by Dasgupta (2002) and Goldstein and Pauzner
(2002) to show that a unique equilibrium will exist even if the payoﬀsd on o ts a t i s f yf u l l
strategic complementarities.
Proposition 2. (Existence) There exists a threshold, s∗, such that patient agents who
receive a signal below s∗ will run and withdraw their funds at t =1 , while patient agents
who receive a signal above s∗ do not run and wait till t =2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows the existence of a threshold signal which deﬁnes the actions of
the depositors. We next show in the Appendix that if premature liquidation is suﬃciently
costly, then this threshold signal is unique and thus there is a unique equilibrium in the
economy.25
Proposition 3. (Uniqueness) The threshold signal, s∗, is unique and hence there is a
unique equilibrium in the depositors’ strategy.
23Carlsson and van Damme (1993) showed this result for a two player binary action game. Morris and
Shin (1998) extended their result to the case where there are a continuum of agents. See Morris and Shin
(2002) for a comprehensive review of the literature on global games.
24See lemma 2 in the Appendix for a formal proof.
25As discussed in the Appendix, even if the suﬃcient condition regarding premature liquidation (stated
in the Appendix) is not satisﬁed, there will still exist a unique equilibrium for plausible values of Rl.
Nevertheless, we assume that early liquidation is suﬃciently costly so that our result holds globally.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?18
Proof. See Appendix.
Having shown the existence of a unique equilibrium in the presence of imperfect in-
formation we now provide an interpretation of the cutoﬀ signal s∗. As discussed more
formally in the Appendix, the unique threshold signal s∗ is such that a patient agent who
receives the signal s∗ will be indiﬀerent between withdrawing early at t =1or waiting till

















where n(φ,s∗) is the proportion of depositors who run for any given φ and s∗.T h i s
equation says that at the threshold signal s∗ the expected payoﬀ from waiting exactly
equals the expected payoﬀ from running.
The uniqueness result enables us to ﬁnd ex ante the expected proportion of depositors
who will run. Since the noisy signals conditional on the realisation of the fundamentals
are all iid, therefore the expectation of the proportion of investors who observe a signal
less than s∗ is exactly equal to the probability an investor assigns to any one depositor
observing a signal less than s∗.T h u s E(n)=θ +( 1− θ)Pr(si <s ∗). We show in the
Appendix that n(φ,s∗) is deﬁned by equation (37). Taking the unconditional expectation







(1 − θ)s∗ − φ
−
+ θ(1 − 2 )
¸
. (24)
Thus the presence of a unique equilibrium allows the bank to identify a unique
∧
n which
is the ex ante expected proportion of depositors who withdraw their funds in the interim
period. From Remark 1 established in section 5.1 we know that there exists a one to one
mapping from a depositors’ equilibrium strategy to an optimal contract. Since we have a
unique equilibrium in the presence of imperfect information it follows that there must also
exist a unique optimal contract in the economy. Hence we have the following corollary to
Proposition 3:
Corollary 1. There exists a unique optimal contract in the presence of imperfect infor-
mation.
The optimal contract in the presence of bank runs and imperfectly informed depositors
maximises entrepreneurs’ expected proﬁts given by (3), subject to the budget constraint









R [1 + h]=1+r (25)
re =
∧
nD(1 + r) (26)
26Note that E(n)=1 · Pr(φ ≤ s∗ −  )+
h







Pr(s∗ −  <φ<s ∗ +  )+
θPr(φ ≥ s∗ +  ). Calculating the probabilities and simplifying we get expression (24).Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?19
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D(1 + r) (27)
where
∧
n is as deﬁned by (24). Equation (25) is the participation constraint of the depos-
itors which says that in competitive credit markets depositors on average need to receive
their reservation utility. Equation (26) is the reserve constraint of the bank. It should
be noted that unlike the perfect information case we can now identify a unique optimal
reserve level since we are able to pin down a unique
∧
n. Finally equation (27) is the bank’s
zero proﬁt condition.
Thus the optimal contract maximises entrepreneurial proﬁts subject to the deposi-
tors’ participation constraint, the reserve constraint, the bank’s zero proﬁt condition, the
budget constraint of the bank and the entrepreneurs’ incentive compatibility condition.
The diﬀerence between the imperfect information optimal contract and the second best
contract is that we need to adjust the constraints to accommodate for the possibility of
bank runs.
7.1. LOLR and imperfect information. Now we introduce a LOLR in this imper-
fect information setting. Suppose for now that the LOLR has perfect information of the
banking system but the depositors observe noisy signals of the economic fundamentals.
Further suppose that the LOLR announces that as long as the bank is solvent in the sense
that in the ﬁnal period it can pay the opportunity cost of funds to the investors who
did not run and the LOLR its loan then it will bail the bank out if it faces any liquidity
problems in the interim period. Hence the LOLR does a debt sustainability analysis and
bails the bank out if and only if
RI + re2 ≥ (1 − n)D(1 + r)+( n − θ)D(1 + r)
or
RI + re2 < (1 − θ)D(1 + r).
This is precisely the solvency condition described in case 1. Thus the LOLR bails the
bank out only if it is solvent, i.e. φ>φ L.
Thus the LOLR here clearly plays a productive role as it avoids the cost of panic
runs and bails out all solvent banks who are experiencing temporary liquidity problems.
The level of bank reserves will now again me at a minimum, just enough to satisfy the
impatient depositors. Hence, we will now be able to reach the second best.
Remark 2. The presence of a perfectly informed LOLR is a Pareto improvement.
Rochet and Vives (2002) also showed that Bagehot was right after all and that the
LOLR is a Pareto improvement. Nevertheless in the next section we check the robustness
of this result when we drop the assumption that the LOLR is perfectly informed.
8. Imperfectly informed LOLR
We now consider the more interesting case where the LOLR does not have perfect infor-
mation and observes a noisy signal of the bank fundamentals.2728 This is realistic and
27We will often refer to an imperfectly informed LOLR as a ‘noisy’ LOLR for the purpose of brevity.
28Since the LOLR observes the number of withdrawals, n(φ,s∗), in order to ensure that the LOLR
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important given that the banks may not be perfectly transparent to the supervisory au-
thorities. Suppose that the LOLR observes a noisy signal, sl, of the bank fundamentals
where
sl = φ +  l. (28)
The noise term  l is uniformly distributed over [− L,  L]. We assume that the distribution
of  l is known by the bank. Further, the precision of the LOLR’s signal is higher than
that of the investors’ signals, i.e.  L <  . This is likely to be the case given that the
LOLR generally has more information about the banks than the individual investors.
We next need to specify the LOLR’s objective function. As before the LOLR aims
to bail out all solvent banks facing short term liquidity problems. But if the information
set of the LOLR is noisy then it might not always be easy to distinguish the solvent but
illiquid banks. Indeed an imperfectly informed LOLR might not bail out a solvent bank
and conversely a noisy LOLR might bail out an insolvent institution. Thus there is a
possibility that an imperfectly informed LOLR may make Type I or Type II errors. We
refer to the situation of not bailing out a solvent bank as a Type I error and the situation
where the LOLR bails out an insolvent bank as a Type II error.
Making either a Type I or Type II error is costly and the nature of the cost will diﬀer
depending on which error is made. Let CI and CII denote the cost of a Type I and Type
II error respectively. CI will incorporate the cost of not bailing out a solvent bank. If the
LOLR does not bail out a solvent bank then it will face a reputational cost apart from
the immediate welfare costs that will be incurred. Furthermore as we will see the bank
will have to hold additional reserves ex ante in anticipation of this error and holding more
reserves than the second best level is ineﬃcient. The level of reserves will be higher, the
higher the probability of a Type I error. Thus we should expect CI to increase as the
probability of a Type I error increases. CII incorporates the cost associated with bailing
out an insolvent bank. We will show later in this section that bailing out an insolvent
bank has moral hazard eﬀects and in general the moral hazard eﬀect increases as the
probability of Type II error increases. Hence we should expect CII to increase as the
probability of a Type II error increases.
Let PI and PII denote the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors respectively.
Further, let s∗
l deﬁne the bail-out strategy of the LOLR such that it bails out the bank
if and only if sl ≥ s∗
l and does not bail out if sl <s ∗
l . Then a natural objective function
of the LOLR would be to choose s∗
l such that it minimises the expected costs of making
errors. More formally s∗
l would be deﬁned as follows:
s∗
l =a r gm i nPI · CI(PI)+PII · CII(PII). (29)
We do not specify the functional form of the cost functions. Instead we work with a
generic s∗
l subject to two qualiﬁcations. First, since the LOLR objective is to bail out
solvent banks, therefore s∗
l ∈ (φL −  L,φL +  L).I fs∗
l >φ L +  L then solvent banks will
LOLR (but is known by the bank since the bank is a pool of depositors). If both n and the distribution
were known by the LOLR, then it will be able to calculate s∗ and hence will be able to observe φ by
inverting n.
More realistically we can also further assume that si is independently but not identically distributed
so that a depositor is also not aware of the distribution of the signals of other agents. Even if the signals
are independently but not identically distributed, it can be shown that there will exist a unique threshold
s∗ for each class of depositors. Thus all the qualitiative results will remain unchanged. Hence to avoid
further complexity in the analysis we retain the simpler assumption of iid signals.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?21
not be bailed out. Conversely, if s∗
l <φ L −  L,, then insolvent banks will be bailed out.
H e n c ei tn e e d st ob et h ec a s et h a tφL− L, <s ∗
l <φ L+ L.29 Second, s∗
l is such that there
exists a positive probability that the LOLR might make Type I and Type II errors. This is
plausible and is likely to be the case in practice if the LOLR has incomplete information.
8.1. The reserve constraint and the zero proﬁt condition in the presence of
a noisy LOLR. We now consider how the presence of a noisy LOLR aﬀects the reserve
constraint and the zero proﬁt condition of the bank. We assume that it is common
knowledge that the LOLR follows a bail-out strategy around s∗
l = φL.
In the presence of a noisy LOLR, the reserve constraint will be as follows:
re =P r ( sl <s ∗
l |φ<φ L)E (n|φ<φ L)D(1 + r) (30)
+Pr(sl <s ∗






n ≡ Pr(sl <s ∗
l |φ<φ L)E (n|φ<φ L)+P r( sl <s ∗
l |φ ≥ φL)E (n|φ ≥ φL). (31)
Equation (30) says that in the presence of a noisy LOLR the reserves will be just suﬃcient
to ensure that the bank on average has enough funds in the interim period to satisfy the
depositors who run if the bank is not bailed out. Note that the probability of a Type
I error, which is given by PI =P r ( sl <s ∗
l |φ ≥ φL), has a direct impact on the reserve
constraint of the bank. The higher the probability of a Type I error, the higher will be
the level of bank reserves since the bank also needs to consider the possibility that it
might not be bailed out even if it is solvent. Nevertheless, it is easy to prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. In the imperfect information setting where the bank fundamentals are
not perfectly observable to the investors, the level of bank reserves in the presence of a
(noisy) LOLR will be lower relative to the case where the LOLR does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason why the level of reserves falls in the presence of a noisy LOLR is that
now the bank will only hold reserves to insure against the possibility that it might not
be bailed out rather than holding reserves to insure against bank runs in general. Recall
that with imperfect information the bank holds more reserves, relative to the second best
level, as some patient depositors may also withdraw in the interim period. Thus the fall
in the level of reserves in the presence of a LOLR is an improvement as it brings us closer
to the second best reserve level.
Let us now consider how the presence of a noisy LOLR aﬀects the zero proﬁt condition.
Before doing so, however, it is instructive to reinterpret the zero proﬁt condition stated
earlier. The zero proﬁt condition in equation (27) can be rewritten as follows:
29We make a technical assumption that  L <
1+φ
−
2 . This ensures that φL +  L < 1 and φL −  L, >φ
−
and hence s∗












= I (1 + r)+
∧
nDr(1 + r).
In section 4 we noted that for every investor expected to run in the interim period, the
bank needs to hold (1 + r) units as reserves instead of one unit. Thus if a proportion
∧
n of
investors are expected to run, then an extra
∧
nDr will be tied up in reserves which have a
zero net rate of return. These resources have an opportunity cost of (1 + r) per unit and
thus the ‘reserve cost’ will be
∧
nDr(1 + r). Thus, the zero proﬁt condition restated above
states that the expected return from the investment portfolio must cover the opportunity
cost of investment funds and the reserve cost.
In the presence of a LOLR, the expected return from investments must cover the
opportunity cost of investment funds and the reserve cost. However, if the LOLR has
imperfect information there will be a third term in the zero proﬁt condition which will
have an oﬀsetting eﬀect. A bank operating in a competitive environment will realise that
there is always a probability that an imperfectly informed LOLR might bail the bank out
even if it is insolvent. This asymmetry of information will act as a subsidy that will relax
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LOLR subsidy
which in terms of our original formulation can be written as:
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D(1 + r) (32)
−Pr(sl ≥ s∗
l |φ<φ L)E (n|φ<φ L)D(1 + r).
Note that the probability of a Type II error, which is given by PII =P r( sl ≥ s∗
l |φ<φ L),
directly aﬀects the zero proﬁt condition. The higher the probability of a Type II error,
the higher will be the value of the implicit subsidy provided by the LOLR to the banking
system. Whereas in the reserve constraint, the distortion came from the possibility of a
Type I error, the zero proﬁt condition is distorted by the possibility of a Type II error.
Given the existence of the LOLR subsidy and given from Proposition 4 that the reserve
level is lower in the presence of a noisy LOLR, it is immediately clear from the zero proﬁt
condition (32) that the lending rate will decrease. We have thus shown the following
result.
Remark 3. The lending rate, (1 + ρ), decreases in the presence of a (noisy) LOLR when
bank fundamentals are not common knowledge.
The reason as to why the lending rate decreases in the presence of a noisy LOLR
is that if the banking system is competitive then the reduction in reserve costs and the
LOLR subsidy will be passed on to the entrepreneurs.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?23
Having worked out the reserve constraint and the zero proﬁt condition it is now
straightforward to state the optimal contract in the presence of a noisy LOLR. The opti-
mal contract in the presence of an imperfectly informed LOLR maximises entrepreneurial
utility (3), subject to investor rationality (9), reserve constraint (30), zero proﬁt condition
(32), budget constraint (7) and incentive compatibility (8). We can solve for the lending
rate directly from the zero proﬁt condition. Solving for (1 + ρ) in (32), after some ma-
nipulation we get the following intuitive expression for the lending rate in the presence of
the LOLR:
















where S ≡ Pr(sl ≥ s∗
l |φ<φ L)E (n|φ<φ L). Thus the lending rate is the risk free rate
scaled by risk and adjusted for reserve costs and the LOLR subsidy.
8.2. LOLR and insolvency. We next examine the important and crucial question
of how the presence of an imperfectly informed LOLR aﬀects the solvency of the banking
system. We show that in the presence of a noisy LOLR, banks are more likely to be
adversely aﬀected by the macroeconomic shock. This result is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. The probability of insolvency of the banking system increases in the
presence of an imperfectly informed LOLR.
Proof. We know from the insolvency criteria described in Case 1, section 5.2, that a
bank is insolvent if it is unable to repay the patient depositors in the ﬁnal period even if
only the impatient depositors withdraw in the interim period. Thus the bank is insolvent
if and only if
∼
RI + re2 < (1 − θ)D(1 + r)
where
∼
R is as deﬁned by equation (2). In the presence of the LOLR, the level of reserves at





D(1 + r) if only the θ-depositors withdraw. To make a distinction
between the insolvency points with and without the LOLR, let φL1 and φL2 denote the
insolvency points in the absence and presence of the LOLR respectively. Then at the










I =( 1− θ)D(1 + r) (34)






and (1 + ρ) is as deﬁn e db ye x p r e s s i o n( 3 3 ) . I n s e r t i n gt h e
expressions for I and (1 + ρ) in equation (34) and noting that ωp = N/I and φL1 =
∧
φ,
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Given competitive credit markets, N will be large enough so that N>
∆












, the probability of





The reason why the probability of insolvency of the bank increases in the presence
of the LOLR is that the bank realises that it might be bailed out even when it is ac-
tually insolvent given information asymmetry between the bank and the LOLR. Thus a
competitive bank internalises the ex ante implicit subsidy provided by the LOLR in its
zero proﬁt condition. This in turn reduces the lending rate subsequently aﬀecting the
insolvency criteria.30
Hence as shown in the proof, in the presence of a noisy LOLR, the probability of insol-






. Note also that that the result in Proposition
5 always holds irrespective of how much the lending rate falls. All that is required is the
presence of an imperfectly informed LOLR which might inadvertently bail out a solvent
institution.
It should be noted that the depositors’ switching threshold, s∗, will not change as a
result of the presence of the LOLR. The switching threshold by deﬁnition is the cutoﬀ
signal at which the expected payoﬀ from running is equal to the expected payoﬀ from
waiting and hence it is the marginal signal at which depositors are indiﬀerent between
running and waiting. Thus the switching threshold will only change if either the investor
payoﬀs change or the probabilities of receiving those payoﬀs changes. Since the investor
payoﬀs do not change, s∗ will only change if the probabilities of receiving a certain payoﬀ
changes. We have seen that in the presence of LOLR, the probability of bank failure
increases. Nevertheless depositors are also aware that the LOLR might bail the bank out.
The zero proﬁt condition is such that these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other, thus
leaving the switching threshold unaltered. This result is natural since the bank is just a
pool of depositors and the zero proﬁt condition changes such that the expected payoﬀst o
the depositors remain the same after taking into account the LOLR subsidy.
8.3. Transparency. We next carry out comparative statics to analyse the eﬀects of
more or less transparency of the banking system. A higher degree of transparency will
translate into more precise signals obtained by the investors, and in particular the LOLR.
A good measure of transparency is therefore the precision of  l.S i n c e  l ∼ U [− L,  L],
precision can be measured by the bound  L. The higher is  L, the less precise the signal
of the LOLR and hence the lower the degree of transparency of the banking system.
An interesting question that then arises is how the probability of insolvency of the
banking system changes as the degree of transparency changes. We prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. The moral hazard problem is directly proportional to the amount of noise
in the information set of the LOLR. Thus the probability of insolvency of the banking
system increases as the degree of transparency worsens.
Proof. See Appendix.
30Since the LOLR subsidy is internalised in the zero proﬁt condition, a competitive bank on average
will be able to pay oﬀ the depositors their reservation utility only after a bail out which is expected with
some probability ex ante.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?25
The intuition behind the above result is simple. As the amount of noise in the in-
formation set of the LOLR increases, the probability of the LOLR inadvertently bailing
out an insolvent institution increases. A competitive bank realises this and hence adjusts
its lending rate accordingly. Thus an increase in the noise, increases the moral hazard
problem which in turn increases the probability of insolvency.
On the other hand, as expected, as the precision of the LOLR’s signal improves, the
probability of both a Type I and Type II error decreases.31 In the limit, as we have also
seen in section 7.1, the economy will reach the second best level if the LOLR is perfectly
informed. This is because as noise decreases, not only does the implicit subsidy provided
by the LOLR decreases, but also bank reserves approach the second best level. This is
because the probability of a Type I error decreases and thus
∆
n approaches θ.T h u s , a s
 L ↓ 0,
∆
n → θ and hence (1 + ρ)LOLR → (1 + ρ)SB.I n o t h e r w o r d s , a s t h e a m o u n t
of noise in the LOLR’s information set decreases, the reserve level and the lending rate
approach the second best levels as deﬁned in Proposition 1. We further establish this
result by studying the impact of noise on aggregate entrepreneurial investment.
Impact on entrepreneurial investment. We next analyse the impact of a noisy
LOLR on entrepreneurial investment level. Note that the total level of entrepreneurial
investment is given by N = T (1 − p∗). We saw in section 5.1 that in an environment with
bank runs where the LOLR does not exist, there is too little investment, i.e. N<N SB.
The reason for underinvestment relative to the second best investment level is that the
bank has to hold higher reserves in order to insure against the possibility of bank runs. A
higher reserve level implies a lower level of entrepreneurial investment as higher reserve
costs increase the lending rate. The increase in the lending rate has an aﬀect on the
incentive compatibility condition increasing the critical skill level p∗ and thus crowding
out investment. In this context the presence of a LOLR can be productive as we know
from Proposition 4 that the level of bank reserves falls in the presence of a LOLR. Thus
the level of entrepreneurial investment increases in the presence of a LOLR.
Nevertheless, there exists a possibility that there might be overinvestment in the pres-
ence of a noisy LOLR as entrepreneurs might also undertake negative NPV projects. Such
overinvestment will take place if the lending rate falls below the second best level. More
precisely N>N SB if and only if (1 + ρ) < (1 + ρ)SB. This will be the case if the following
condition is satisﬁed.
Condition 1. As u ﬃcient condition for N>N SB is that r<S /
∆
n.
Condition 1 follows from a straightforward comparison of expression (33) with expres-
sion (11). If S>
∆
nr then (1 + ρ)LOLR < (1 + ρ)SB given that
∆
n>θ>0. The condition
states that there will be entrepreneurial overinvestment in the presence of a noisy LOLR
if the risk free rate is not too high. Note that this condition is likely to be satisﬁed for
plausible levels of the risk free rate. The intuition behind Condition 1 is simple. If the risk
free rate is not too high, then the opportunity cost of holding reserves will be low. Low
reserve costs coupled with a LOLR subsidy will push the lending rate below the second
best level consequently causing overinvestment in the economy.
It is easy to check that ∂ (1 + ρ)/∂ L is negative if Condition 1 is satisﬁed and positive
otherwise. Thus irrespective of whether Condition 1 is satisﬁed or not, a reduction in the
noise level will bring the economy closer to the second best level.
31See Proof of Proposition 6.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?26
Remark 4. As  L ↓ 0, the economy approaches the second best level.
Ex ante versus ex post eﬃciency. Intuition then suggests that if the LOLR’s
noise level is ‘low enough’, an imperfectly informed LOLR might be a Pareto improvement.
We therefore now compare the costs and beneﬁts of the presence of a noisy LOLR and
see how these vary with the noise level. Our intuition will be conﬁrmed if we show that
at low noise levels the beneﬁts will outweigh the costs and vice versa.
In Proposition 5 we showed that the presence of a noisy LOLR increases the probability
of insolvency. Thus, the presence of an imperfectly informed LOLR is ex ante ineﬃcient.
Nevertheless, ex post the LOLR can prevent ineﬃcient liquidation. There therefore exists
at r a d e - o ﬀ between ex ante versus ex post eﬃciency.
To quantify this trade-oﬀ we need to compare the expected costs and beneﬁts for
a given level of noise. Suppose that the cost of insolvency is given by C units of the
consumption good.32 We showed in the proof to Proposition 5 that with the presence
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insolvency point in the presence of a LOLR. Since the insolvency point, φL2,i saf u n c t i o n








Having quantiﬁed ex ante ineﬃciency we next turn to the gains from ex post eﬃciency.
We know that the optimal contract is such that ex ante no premature liquidations take
place. This is because it is less costly to hold reserves relative to ineﬃcient liquidations
and thus banks adjust their reserve levels accordingly. Thus the reduction in the reserve
c o s tw i t ht h ep r e s e n c eo faL O L Ri sam e a s u r eo ft h ee xp o s te ﬃciency. The reduction in







Dr(1 + r).N o t et h a t
as discussed in section 8.1, the reserve level is higher, the higher is the probability of a
Type I error. Thus as noise increases the expected gains from ex post eﬃciency decreases.
Let  ∗ be the level of noise at which the expected gains are just equal to the expected
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C =0 . (36)
We know that such a critical level,  ∗, exists because the expected gains are monotonically
decreasing in  L and the expected costs are monotonically increasing in  L.T h u si f L <  ∗,
then the expected gains from ex post eﬃciency outweigh the costs of ex ante ineﬃciency
and vice versa.
Proposition 7. The presence of an imperfectly informed LOLR will be a Pareto im-
provement if and only if  L <  ∗ where  ∗ solves equation (36).
It can be argued that one policy implication that emerges from the analysis is that
the LOLR should choose a bail-out strategy, s∗
l , such that given the distribution of the
noise term, there is a zero probability of a Type II error. This is because we know that
the moral hazard problem is directly proportional to the probability of a Type II error.
32The cost of insolvency will include the cost of bail out, the cost of unemployment, social ineﬃciencies
and other social costs. Endogenising these costs is outside the scope of this paper and we take C as given.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?27
Nevertheless such a statement is misleading and is subject to two qualiﬁcations. First,
since the probabilities of a Type I and Type II error are inversely related, decreasing
the probability of a Type II error to zero will signiﬁcantly increase the probability of a
Type I error. The costs associated with a Type I error should not be understated. By
not bailing out a solvent bank, the LOLR will not only suﬀer reputational and credibility
costs but more importantly there are likely to be contagious costs which will spill over to
the entrepreneurial sector. Thus the cost of a Type I error cannot be overemphasised.33
The LOLR therefore needs to be very careful before deciding not to bail out a bank given
that the immediate costs in case of a Type I error can be substantial. Thus the optimal
bail-out strategy will be as deﬁn e di ne x p r e s s i o n( 2 9 )a n dw i l lg i v ew e i g h tt ot h ec o s t so f
both a Type I and Type II error.
Second, we have assumed that the noise term in the LOLR’s signal has a bounded
uniform distribution. This assumption was made for tractability. However, if the noise
term followed an unbounded distribution, say normality, then there will always exist a
positive probability of both a Type I and Type II error. In reality there is always likely
to be a chance that the LOLR might make mistakes in both directions. Thus the sensible
policy implication which follows is that the LOLR should improve the quality of bank
monitoring and supervision so as to minimise the probabilities of errors.
9. Discussion
As mentioned before, the model that we have developed can be applied both to a domestic
and international setting. In a domestic setting, the central bank will carry out LOLR
operations. In an international setting, the depositors in our model can be interpreted as
international investors and an institution like the IMF would play the role of international
lender of last resort.
Our model shows the interlinkages between diﬀerent sectors of the economy and how
shocks are transmitted within sectors via the banking system. We showed that there
exists a one to one mapping from the depositors’ equilibrium strategy to an optimal
contract prevailing in the economy. In the presence of imperfect information, depositors
in our model run only if their signals about the underlying fundamentals are below a
certain threshold. Thus banking crises are not unrelated to the real economy as long as
depositors do not have perfect information. The sunspot theories are thus a special case
which hold validity only if the depositors have perfect information.
In the case of perfect information, we showed that it is indeed true that there may
exist multiple equilibria, where either everyone runs or no one runs. However, we showed
that if depositors observe only noisy signals of the fundamentals, then in general there will
exist a unique equilibrium. Thus perfect information can actually be destablising relative
to a small amount of noise. This result was also obtained by Morris and Shin (2001) and
Rochet and Vives (2002) who argued that a small amount of noise in the fundamentals
can actually be stabilising. However, we showed in our model that this result only holds
in the absence of the LOLR. We thus argue that in the presence of another institution,
like the LOLR, perfect information can actually lead the economy back to the second best
arrangement. Hence, under such a scenario the presence of the LOLR is clearly a Pareto
improvement.
However, if the information set of the LOLR is noisy, then our earlier conclusion that
the LOLR is a Pareto improvement falls into ambiguity. On the one hand, the LOLR is
33Goodhart and Huang (2003) show that the central bank will have an incentive to carry out LOLR
operations, even in the presence of moral hazard, given the sizeable cost of contagion.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?28
productive ex post as it can avoid ineﬃcient liquidation. On the other hand, the presence
of an imperfectly informed LOLR is conducive to the moral hazard problem and is thus
ex ante ineﬃcient. Because of this moral hazard problem, we showed that the probability
of insolvency of the banking system actually increases in the presence of the LOLR.
Furthermore, the moral hazard problem aggravates the adverse selection problem faced
by the banks. This is because competitive banks internalise the implicit subsidy provided
by the LOLR and thus reduce the lending rates. This in turn aﬀects the incentives of the
entrepreneurs and we showed that there exists a possibility that the level of investment
might increase above the second best optimal level. In other words, the presence of a
LOLR might lead to overinvestment in the economy.
In our model, we had assumed throughout that the strong law of large number applies
and hence there was no uncertainty with regards to idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk.
Hence the only source of uncertainty was the macroeconomic shock which hit the economy.
However, had we not assumed that the SLLN holds, then our results would have been
even stronger. This is because the banks would then face an additional risk regarding
the realisation of the idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk. In the presence of an imperfectly
informed LOLR, a reduction in the lending rate will increase the entrepreneurial risk faced
by the banks because the average success probability of projects will decline. Under such a
scenario, if there is overinvestment in the economy, then the economy will be more fragile
relative to the case where the LOLR does not exist.
We believe that this is what happened in the Asian crisis (1997). The East Asian
economies had a competitive banking system and the government had provided implicit
or explicit insurance to the ﬁnancial intermediaries. The government in turn expected an
IMF bail out in case of a debt crisis.34 Subsequently, there was substantial overinvestment
in East Asia. A good example is Thailand, where the ﬁnance companies were largely
unregulated and there was massive overinvestment in the real estate and property sector.
Thus the Asian economies were already fragile before they were hit by a speculative shock
which adversely aﬀected their currencies.
Krugman (1998) argued that the Asian crisis occurred because of the moral hazard
problem. However, in the following year, Krugman (1999) asserted that he was wrong,
and that the Asian crisis was in fact due a balance sheet transfer problem. Our model
shows that Krugman was actually correct both times. There did exist a moral hazard
problem in Asia. Subsequently, when the Asian economies were hit by a shock, the moral
hazard problem translated into a balance sheet transfer problem. The adverse impact on
the entrepreneurs’ balance sheet was consequently transferred to investors via the banking
system.
We do not recommend that a LOLR should not exist. Indeed, we have shown that
the LOLR can be ex post eﬃcient. The policy implication that stems from our model
is that the banking system be as transparent as possible to the LOLR. In other words,
the noise in the LOLR’s information set be at a minimal. We showed that if the noise in
the LOLR’s information set is suﬃciently low then the gains from ex post eﬃciency can
outweigh the ex ante ineﬃciency. On the contrary, if the precision of the LOLR’s signal
is not high enough, then the net eﬀe c to ft h ep r e s e n c eo faL O L Ro nt h ee c o n o m yw i l l
be negative. Hence, if the LOLR is to play a productive role, it is imperative that the
34Note that as we showed in our model, there will exist a morzal hazard problem, even if a bail out is
not guaranteed. All that is required is that the agent expect a bail out from the principal with a positive
probability. Of course, the higher the probability of bailing out an insolvent institution, the more severe
would be the moral hazard problem.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?29
information set of the LOLR be as precise as possible. This can be achieved by closer
monitoring of the banking system. Thus the supervisory process of the banking system
should be strict and eﬃcient. It is also vital that the supervisory process be independent
and free of any political interference.
This brings into question the increasing trend to delegate supervisory authority to a
separate agency as distinct from the central bank. For example, banking supervision in
the UK is now under the domain of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). However, the
LOLR operations are carried by the central bank. To the extent that there exist conﬂicts
of interest between the supervisory authority and the central bank, the LOLR operations
can be adversely aﬀected. This is because the LOLR might not have access to ‘relevant
information’. The objective function of the supervisory authority might be diﬀerent from
the central bank and hence the two bodies might have diﬀerent perspectives on what
constitutes ‘relevant information’.35 As we demonstrated in our model, as the precision
of the LOLR’s signal regarding the solvency of the banks worsens, the probability of
insolvency of the banking system increases. Hence, the prime objective of the supervisory
authorities should be to pass as precise information as possible to the LOLR so that it can
carry out its operations eﬀectively. If the LOLR is better able to collect such information
directly, then the delegation of banking supervision to another body is not justiﬁed. This
would therefore largely depend on how well the two bodies can cooperate with each other.
10. Summary and conclusions
We obtain the following results with respect to the role of the LOLR in banking crises:
(a) the presence of a perfectly informed LOLR can be a Pareto improvement as costly
liquidations can be avoided; (b) perfect transparency between banks and depositors is good
if and only if there exists a perfectly informed LOLR; (c) in the presence of an imperfectly
informed LOLR, the probability of insolvency of the banking system increases; (d) the
moral hazard problem is directly proportional to the noise in the LOLR’s information
set; (e) as the noise in the LOLR’s information set increases, the economy moves further
away from the second best arrangement and vice versa; (f) the presence of an imperfectly
informed LOLR can be a Pareto improvement as long as the noise in its information set
is suﬃciently low; (g) the banking system should be as much transparent as possible to
the LOLR. We have therefore provided a framework which places considerable emphasis
on the role of information in the evolution of crises.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :When an agent receives a signal si her beliefs about the
distribution of the fundamentals are uniform in the interval [si −  ,si +  ]. Suppose for
now that all agents follow a switching strategy around s∗, i.e. they withdraw in the interim
period if and only if s<s ∗. Following Dasgupta (2002) we shall refer to such switching
strategies as monotone strategies and the associated equilibria as monotone equilibria.L e t
n(φ,s∗) denote the proportion of people who will run for any given φ and s∗.G i v e nt h a t
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if φ ∈ (s∗ −  ,s∗ +  )
θ if φ ≥ s∗ +  
. (37)
35For example as argued by Goodhart (2000), the supervisory body might be more concerned about








RlI and the optimal value of re and I is as deﬁned in (17) and (19)
respectively, we can rewrite the investor payoﬀs in (23) in terms of a generic optimal
contract. The payoﬀ matrix can thus be written as follows:






























Note that the payoﬀs depend on the optimal reserve level which in turn is a function
of the threshold signal s∗.Let π(φ,n) denote the diﬀerence in the patient agent’s payoﬀ
function from waiting till t =2rather than running at t =1 .π(φ,n) is thus given by
π(φ,n)=
½
−g(φ,s∗) if n>n B
h(φ,s∗) − (1 + r) if n ≤ nB
.
Let Π(si,s ∗) be the diﬀerence in the expected utility of a patient depositor from waiting
rather than running conditional on the observed signal si. The posterior distribution of
fundamentals given the observed signal is uniform and is given by
φ|si ∼ U [si −  ,si +  ]





A monotone equilibrium s∗ exists if Π(s∗,s ∗)=0 , Π(si,s ∗) > 0 for si >s ∗ and if
Π(si,s ∗) < 0 for si <s ∗. The existence of upper and lower dominance regions implies
that Π(si,s ∗) is negative for suﬃciently low s∗ and positive for suﬃciently high s∗.T h u s
by continuity, Π(·,·) must cross the axis somewhere. Continuity holds because a change in
si,g i v e ns∗, only change the limits of integration. We know that π(φ,n) < 0 ∀φ<s ∗ − 
and π(φ,n) > 0 ∀φ<s ∗ +  . Since by continuity, Π(s∗,s ∗)=0at some s∗,t h u s
the positive and negative parts of the integral exactly cancel out. Increasing si above
s∗ increases the positive part of the integral, while reducing the negative part. Hence
Π(si,s ∗) > 0 for si >s ∗.C o n v e r s e l y ,Π(si,s ∗) < 0 for si <s ∗. This proves the existence
of a monotone equilibrium. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :We break the proof of the uniqueness of equilibrium into
two parts. We ﬁrst show that there exists a unique equilibrium in monotone strategies.
After showing the uniqueness of equilibrium in monotone strategies we then show that
there are no non-monotone equilibria.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?31
Let Π(s∗)=Π(s∗,s ∗). We need to show that Π(s∗) is monotone in s∗.G i v e n
that beliefs are uniformly distributed over the interval [φ −  ,φ +  ],n o t et h a tnB =
(1/2 )(s∗ − (φ −  )), which implies that φ = s∗ +  (1 − 2nB). Therefore if n ≤ nB,t h e n
φ>s ∗+ (1 − 2nB).C o n v e r s e l y ,n>n B implies that φ<s ∗ + (1 − 2nB). Hence Π(s∗)







[h(φ,s∗) − (1 + r)]dφ.













[h(φ,s∗) − (1 + r)]dφ.






























Similarly we get an analogous expression for the derivative of the integral under h(φ,s∗).








¯ ¯ ¯ given that φ and s∗ enter
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It can be shown that if premature liquidation is suﬃciently costly, then this condition will







(1 − Rl)+ωp (1 + ρ)+( 1− ωp)(1+r)
¸
< 1.
Even if this suﬃcient condition is not satisﬁed, it is more likely than not that the equi-
librium in monotone strategies will be unique. Nevertheless, we impose this suﬃcient
condition to ensure that there is always a unique equilibrium in monotone strategies.
We next need to demonstrate that there are no equilibria associated with non-monotone
strategies, i.e. there are no non-monotone equilibria. To do this we ﬁrst establish a number
of lemmas which we will then use to demonstrate our uniqueness result.
Lemma 1. Let n(φ) be an agent’s arbitrary feasible belief regarding the proportion of
agents demanding early withdrawal as a function of the true state φ.T h u s ,n(φ) reﬂects











Proof. Let y(si) represent the belief of agent i regarding the mass of patient agents













[y(φ +  ) − y(φ −  )].
The result then follows since y(si) ∈ [0,1].
Thus, Lemma 1 places restrictions on the derivative of n(φ) with respect to φ. Lemma
2 below states that full strategic complementarities are only satisﬁed when the bank is not
bankrupt. Thus, when the bank is not bankrupt an agent’s incentive to run increases with
the proportion of agents running. However, once the bank is bankrupt, agent’s actions
are strategic substitutes rather than complements. In this case the payoﬀ from running
decreases with the proportion of agents running.
Lemma 2. When n ≤ nB,
∂π(φ,n)
∂φ > 0 and
∂π(φ,n)
∂n < 0. However, when n>n B,
∂π(φ,n)
∂φ < 0 and
∂π(φ,n)
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Proof. When n ≤ nB, π (φ,n)=h(φ,s∗) − (1 + r). Taking the partial derivative of

















Rl (1 − n)
−
R(·)n(1 + r)




∂n < 0 if and only if
R(·)(1+r)
Rl (1 − n)
+
R(·)n(1 + r)













which after some simpliﬁcation is equivalent to







This is indeed the case since Rl < 1. Hence
∂π(φ,n)
∂n < 0 when n ≤ nB. Further, since n
is decreasing in φ,w eh a v e
∂π(φ,n)
∂φ > 0 when n ≤ nB.
Now consider the case when n>n B.W en o wh a v eπ(φ,n)=−g(φ,s∗).T a k i n gt h e










∂n < 0 if and only if
Rl +
∧
n(1 + r)(1− Rl)
n2 > 0
which is indeed the case since Rl < 1. Hence,
∂π(φ,n)
∂n > 0 when n>n B.F u r t h e r ,s i n c en
is decreasing in φ,w eh a v e
∂π(φ,n)
∂φ < 0 when n>n B.
Lemma 3 below shows that even though the payoﬀs do not satisfy full strategic comple-
mentarities, but nevertheless under some restrictions they satisfy a weak form of strategic
complementarities. Lemma 3 will later be used to show the uniqueness of the switching
threshold.
Lemma 3. Suppose there exist φT, φB and φ
0 (φ) such that 0 <φ T − φB ≤ 2  and
φ
0 (φ) ≤ φB. Assume that n(φ) ≥ θ +( 1− θ)
(φT−φ)



























Proof. First suppose that π
³




> 0 for all φ ∈ [φT,φ B].T h e ni n
t h i sc a s eu s i n gl e m m a2i ti st r i v i a lt os h o wt h a tπ
³









∀φ and hence the result of the lemma holds.Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?34
Since n(φ) ≥ θ+(1− θ)
(φT−φ)





can either fall in the strategic comple-
ments range (where the bank is not bankrupt and n ≤ nB) or in the strategic substitutes





falls in the strate-
gic complements range, then from lemma 2 we know that π
³












dφ > 0 and
dπ(·,·)





falls in the strategic





< 0.T h i si sb e c a u s eπ(φ,n) is always negative
in the strategic substitutes range. In fact, since π(φ,n)=−g(φ,n) in this range, the




n(1 + r)(1− Rl)
i
< 0. (This value will be
attained when n =1 .) Thus if π
³




> 0 then the result of the lemma
follows trivially, given lemma 2.
Now suppose that π
³




is positive for some φ, but negative for
some other φ,w h e r eφ ∈ [φT,φ B].L e tm(φ)=θ+(1− θ)
(φT−φ)
2  .S i n c em(φ) is monotone
in φ, there is exactly one point, say φ1,w h e r eπ (φ,m(φ)) = 0,i . e . π(φ1,m(φ1)) = 0.
Deﬁne φ2 as
φ2 =i n f
©



























< 0 ∀φ ∈ [φB,φ 2).
Proof. Suppose that φ<min(φ1,φ 2).T h e ns i n c eφ is strictly less than min(φ1,φ 2),
π(φ,m(φ)) < 0. Now we have two possibilities. First, we might have m(φ) >n B.S i n c e





< 0 as it is in the strategic












strategic complements range. If π (·,·) lies in the strategic complements range then since
in this range
dπ(·,·)
dφ > 0 and
dπ(·,·)






π(φ,m(φ)) < 0 for all φ ∈ [φB,min(φ1,φ 2)).T h u s ,w en e e dt ov e r i f yt h a tmin(φ1,φ 2)=
φ2 to show that the claim is true. Suppose that min(φ1,φ 2)=φ1. Then there exists





≥ 0. But then by continuity there exists a





=0 , which is a contradiction as φ2 =
inf
©







.T h u s ,φ2 <φ 1.
Claim 2.




Proof. At φ1, π
³















































0 (φ) ≤ φB and φ1 ∈ (φB,φ T), therefore φ
0 (φ2) <φ 1. But then given the above
it has to be the case that n(φ2) <m(φ1).
Now we can use claims 1 and 2 to show that the inequality in (38) holds. By changing







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂φ
∂m

















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂φ
∂n












Now the second integral is smaller than the ﬁrst integral because it is negative in the
range considered by claim 1, because it is computed over a range that is smaller by claim
2( n(φ2) <m(φ1)) and because |∂φ/∂n| ≥ |∂φ/∂m| b yl e m m a1 .T h i sp r o v e st h a tt h e
















The ﬁrst inequality holds as φ2 <φ 1 by claim 1. The second inequality follows from
inequality (38) and because m(φ) declines faster than n(φ).












which proves the lemma.
We can now use the result obtained from lemma (3) to show that there do not exist any
equilibria in non-monotone strategies. From Proposition (2) we know that there exists aBanking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?36
threshold signal s∗ such that Π(s∗,n)=0and that Π(si,n) ≶ 0 ∀si ≶ s∗. If there is only
one equilibrium then the threshold s∗ will be unique and it will be a monotone equilibrium.
Hence, if we can establish that there is only one point s∗,s u c ht h a tΠ(s∗,n)=0 ,t h e n
we would have proved the existence of non-monotone equilibrium. We provide a proof by
contradiction.
Suppose that there exist more than one s∗,w h i c hs o l v eΠ(s∗,n)=0 .L e t φH =
sup{si : Π(si,n)=0 },a n dφL =s u p {si : si <φ H,Π(si,n)=0 }.N o w Π(si,n) < 0
∀si ∈ (φL,φ H).S u p p o s et h a tφH − φL < 2 . Then, we have



















0 ≤ φL + . Consider the transformation φ
0 (φ)=φL +φH −φ. Then by a change













We will now prove a claim which will then be used to demonstrate our Proposition.
Claim 3. n(φ)=θ +
(1−θ)
2  (φH − φ +  ) for all φ ∈ [φL +  ,φH +  ] and n(φH −  ) ≥
n(φL +  ).
Proof. Note that when φ ∈ [φL +  ,∞), si ∈ [φL,∞) and the only si for which
Π(si,n) < 0 lie in the range (φL,φ H). Thus for all φ ∈ [φL +  ,∞), n(φ)=P r( si ≤ φH|φ).
In particular for φ ∈ [φL +  ,φH +  ], n(φ)=P r ( si ≤ φH|φ)=θ +
(1−θ)
2  (φH − φ +  ),
which proves the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ec l a i m . S i m i l a r l y ,n(φL +  )=θ +
(1−θ)
2  (φH − φL).
Note that for φ ∈ (−∞,φ H −  ], n(φ) ≥ Pr(si >φ L|φ).T h i s i s b e c a u s e φL <φ H −  
and while Π(si,n) is deﬁnitely negative between φL and φH, it can also be negative
elsewhere. Therefore, n(φH −  ) ≥ Pr(si >φ L|φH −  )=θ +
(1−θ)
2  (φH − φL). Hence,
n(φH −  ) ≥ θ +
(1−θ)
2  (φH − φL)=n(φL +  ), which proves the claim.




















2  (φT − φ)
´
dφ ≥ 0.S i n c e φ
0 (φ) ≤ φB, then given claim 3
we have n(φ
0) ≥ θ +
(1−θ)
2  (φT − φ) for all φ ∈ [φB,φ T]. Now from a straightforwardBanking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort:How crucial is the role of information?37
application of lemma 3 it follows that Π(φH,n) > Π(φL,n). But if there exist more than
one s∗,t h e nΠ(φH,n) − Π(φL,n)=0 , which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : Let reLOLR =
∆







n are as deﬁned in (31) and (24) respectively. We need to show that reLOLR <




n or if and only if
Pr(sl <s ∗
l |φ<φ L)E (n|φ<φ L)+P r( sl <s ∗
l |φ ≥ φL)E (n|φ ≥ φL) <E(n).
Using the law of iterated expectations, E (n)=Eφ [E (n|φ)].T h u sreLOLR <r e no LOLR
if and only if
Pr(sl <s ∗
l |φ<φ L)E (n|φ<φ L)+P r( sl <s ∗
l |φ ≥ φL)E (n|φ ≥ φL) <
Pr(φ<φ L)E (n|φ<φ L)+P r( φ ≥ φL)E (n|φ ≥ φL)
or if and only if
[Pr(φ<φ L) − Pr(sl <s ∗
l |φ<φ L)]E (n|φ<φ L)+
[Pr(φ ≥ φL) − Pr(sl <s ∗
l |φ ≥ φL)]E (n|φ ≥ φL) > 0.
This will be the case if Pr(φ<φ L) > Pr(sl <s ∗
l |φ<φ L) and
Pr(φ ≥ φL) > Pr(sl <s ∗




Pr(φ<φL) and Pr(sl <s ∗




Since Pr(sl <s ∗
l ∩ φ<φ L) < 1 and Pr(sl <s ∗
l ∩ φ ≥ φL) < 1, this proves the propo-
sition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: We know from the zero proﬁt condition (32) that the
higher the LOLR subsidy, the greater would be the negative impact on the zero proﬁt
condition and hence the worse the moral hazard problem. It is also clear from equation
(35) that an increase in S, will increase the insolvency point φL2 and hence the probability
of insolvency. Thus to prove the proposition, all that we need to show is that ∂S
∂ L > 0.
Since, S =P r( sl ≥ s∗
l |φ<φ L)E (n|φ<φ L), ∂S
∂ L > 0 if and only if
∂ Pr(sl≥s∗
l |φ<φL)




∂ L > 0,w eﬁrst need to calculate an analytical expression
for Pr(sl ≥ s∗
l |φ<φ L).W ed ot h i sa sf o l l o w s :






































































































Simplifying the above, we get the following expression for the probability of a Type II
error:
PII =









Analagously, it can be shown that the probability of a Type I error is as follows:
PI =
 L + s∗
l − 1




l is such that both PI and PII are positive, therefore from (40) it follows






/2+ L. Similarly, from (41) it follows that
PI > 0 if and only if s∗
l > (1 + φL)/2 −  L. Hence both PI and PII are positive if






/2+ L. Note that for this restriction to make sense





/2. The intuition is that if signals are very
precise then it will not be possible to make both Type I and Type II errors given a bounded
distribution. From footnote 29 also note that  L < (1 + φL)/2. Hence if PI and PII are















2 L − 2
∙











∂ L > 0 if and only if 2s∗
l −φL − φ
−






/2,w h i c h
is the case. Using the same line of reasoning it follows that ∂PI
∂ L > 0. Q.E.D.
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